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RECENT CHALLENGES TO THE PERSISTENT
DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER*
INTRODUCTION
Take a moment sometime and attempt to explain to your spouse or child
the dual banking system. Explain that if they want to open a bank, they can
choose either a state or federal charter. If they choose a federal charter,' their
regulator, whose headquarters is in Washington, D.C., would likely be more
sophisticated and, perhaps, more stringent and detached. If they choose the
state charter, their regulator would be more familiar with their community,
more sympathetic to their business concerns and not nearly as far away. Cus-
tomers would neither know nor care which charter they chose, 2 and regardless
of their choice, customer's deposits would be insured by the FDIC.3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America. The author wishes to thank her newborn baby Thor Schooner for allowing her enough
time to complete this essay. She also wishes to thank Steve Schooner for his comments, insights
and patience.
1. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") is the federal agency respon-
sible for chartering and supervising all nationally-chartered commercial banks. 12 U.S.C. § 26,
93(a) (1994). The other federal banking agencies are: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion ("FDIC"), the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"), and the Board of Governors for the
Federal Reserve System ("Fed"). The FDIC is the primary federal regulator for state-chartered,
commercial banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(3)
(1994). The FDIC also has the ability, under certain circumstances, to bring enforcement ac-
tions against any insured bank and its officers, directors and other affiliated professionals. 12
U.S.C. § 1818(t) (1994). The OTS is the primary federal regulator for savings associations. 12
U.S.C. § 1463 (1994). The Fed is the primary federal regulator for bank holding companies and
state-chartered, commercial banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C.
§§ 248, 1844 (1994).
2. Most customers are also not aware that, until recently, interstate branching by banks
was prohibited. Large banks did their best to let consumers believe that their bank operated in
many states. In fact, however, these banks were simply operating (and many continue to oper-
ate) under common ownership of a bank holding company-the banks themselves were sepa-
rately chartered in the respective jurisdictions in which they operated. True interstate branching
is new to the banking industry. See infra Part III.
3. National banks and state banks that are members of the Fed are required to carry FDIC
insurance; state banks that are not members of the Fed are not so required. 12 U.S.C. §
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Archaic, arcane, or simply bizarre, the dual banking system-which allows
a bank to be chartered and supervised by either federal or state authorities-is
here to stay. Just as one hesitates before pulling on Superman's cape, bankers,
bank regulators and legislators are reluctant to criticize the dual banking sys-
tem.4 For various, and sometimes less than convincing reasons, the banking
industry continues to hail the dual banking system as an integral part of the
United States banking industry, entitled to the same deference as mom, base-
ball, and apple pie. Some scholars, however, remain skeptical over the,need
for this apparently inefficient structure.
Recent changes in the banking industry challenge some of the best of the
justifications for the dual banking system. Still, the system persists and, al-
though the balance of power between state and federal authority shifts toward
the federal, the system does not appear to be in danger of extinction.
To clarify, the criticism is not aimed broadly at the dual system-rather,
the state side of the dual banking system is vulnerable to attack. 5 Either be-
cause of the national interest in the nation's financial system or the existence
of federal deposit insurance, the federal side of the dual banking system is not
subject to any threat of extinction. Therefore, the arguments in favor and
against the dual banking system center on the proper role for states in the
regulation of banks. This debate, however, is rarely heard in the halls of Con-
gress. It is no small wonder that no one on Capitol Hill has spearheaded the
demise of the dual banking system, since no significant constituency would be
gained by doing so.6 Therefore, the dual banking system, for better or worse,
is here to stay.
This essay continues with a brief discussion of the history of the dual
banking system in Part I. Part II reviews the justifications for, arid criticisms
of, the dual banking system. Part III details the recent challenges to the dual
banking system. Part IV looks to the future of the dual banking system and
concludes that Congress has chosen not to preempt entirely the states' author-
ity despite the continued erosion of states' authority over safety and soundness
issues. This leaves the states with a continuing opportunity to serve as labo-
ratories of innovation in bank regulation. If the states seize this opportunity,
their role in the regulation of banks will persist inevitably regardless of politi-
cal fortune.
1818(a)(1) (1994). For competitive reasons, however, few depository institutions operate with-
out federal depository insurance at the present time.
4. Similarly, the dual banking system has been coined the "sacred cow" of bank regula-
tion. Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK. L. REv. I (1987).
5. This is somewhat remarkable since state banks were well-established prior to the crea-
tion of national banks. See infra Part 1.
6. Congress, however, has passed legislation that would undermine the system: See infra
Part Ill.
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
States began chartering banks long before the federal government entered
that domain. When Congress created national banks in 1863, the dual banking
system was the unintended byproduct.7 Congress passed the National Bank
Act of 1863 to providd for a uniform national currency and to help finance the
Civil War.8 The intent was not to create a'dual banking system. Rather, the
drafters of the legislation expected existing state banks to convert from state to
,federal charters. 9 This arguably naive expectation never came to fruition.
When wholesale charter conversion failed to occur, Congress tried again.
In 1865, Congress passed legislation imposing a prohibitive tax on state bank
notes.10  State banks, however, avoided the tax by developing checking ac-
counts-thereby eliminating the need for bank notes." The tax on state banks,
however, served as an incentive for new banks to seek national charters. Soon
national banks began receiving charters and, in doing so, established the sec-
ond side of the dual banking system, the national side. 2 It should come as no
surprise that, based on this history of not so carefully executed long-term plan-
ning, the existence of the dual banking system has been labeled "an historical
accident." ' 3
II. THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
The dual banking system has endured since its creation in 1863. Although
seemingly redundant, the existence of the system has been justified, post hoc,
by many. One of the most often-cited defenses of the dual banking system is
that it creates healthy competition between federal and state regulators.'4 This
theory posits that competition between regulators derives from banks' ability
to choose between federal and state regulators as their charter-provider and
primary.regulator and banks' ability to convert from a federal to a state charter,
7. For comprehensive discussions of the history of the dual banking system, see Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, The Federal Response, and The Case For
Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1152-55 (1990); Henry N.
Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 677, 681-83 (1988); Miller, supra note 4, at 13-14.
8. Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 681.
9. Id.
10. Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30
STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1977).
11. Miller, supra note 4, at 14.
12. Ross M. ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION: A HISTORICAL
APPRAISAL 54 (1995).
13. Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 681.
14. Professor Scott's seminal article on the dual banking system explores the issue of
regulatory competition in detail. Scott, supra note 10.
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or vice versa, if dissatisfied with either regulator.'5 Banks' ability to choose
their regulator, arguably, pits federal and state agencies against one another,
forcing them to alter regulatory practices and procedures to enhance their abil-
ity to attract and retain bank charters. 16
Other justifications for the dual banking system areclosely related. Shar-
ing a common states rights theme, these defenses of the dual banking system
are really justifications of the continued existence of state banks, rather than
justifications of the dual system of banking. State regulators are deemed to be
more in touch with the needs of their communities. James Watt, President and
CEO of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors commented that: "State de-
partments are on the ground. They know the bank, they know the manage-
ment, they know the local community and they know the trends that are afoot
in the state's economy."' 17 Generally, state legislators are also seen as more
responsive to the needs of their constituents, particularly small banks.'" Simi-
larly, and potentially most significantly, the dual banking system is credited
with allowing for state and local innovation in financial services. A former
Superintendent of Banks for New York State wrote: "It is here that bankers
know the needs of their customers, the strength or weakness of their local
economies and the products to offer to attract new business."19The dual banking system is, however, far from being immune to criticism.
While competition between regulators leads hypothetically towards more effi-
cient (i.e., fewer and better) regulations, this type of competition has been
criticized for creating "a destructive 'competition in laxity' between federal
and state regulators that encourages regulators to neglect safety and soundness
concerns in order to build their regulated constituencies. '20
Apart from whether competition between the regulators has positive or
negative impacts on the banking industry, the theory of competition has been
challenged by commentators who dispute the existence of a competitive envi-
ronment.21 Professors Butler and Macey cite five "forces" that prevent regu-
latory competition:
15. Id. at 8-36.
16. Id. at 30-32.
17. James B. Watt, The Dual Banking System Now More Than Ever, Address at the Con-
ference of State Bank Supervisors Annual Meeting and Conference 4 (April 15-18, 1994).
18. Robertson, supra note 12, at 8.
19. Jill M. Considine, A State's Response to the United States Treasury Department Pro-
posals to Modernize the Nation's Banking System, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. S243, S244 (1991).
20. Wilmarth, supra note 7, at 1241. Professor Wilmarth asserts that the competition in
laxity argument "overlooks the strong incentive of both elected public officials and appointed
bank regulators to avoid bank failures." Id. at 1242.
21. Butler & Macey, supra note 7, at 693. Professors Butler and Macey argue, among
other things, that the regulation of banks does not provide evidence of the existence of competi-
tion.
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(1) the federal government's ability to preempt state regulations; (2) the federal
government's provision of the only viable deposit insurance through the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation-this leaves state banks subject to federal-
FDIC regulation; (3) federal legislation, which, until recently prevented inter-
state banking; (4) the doctrine of "competitive equality," which limits national
banks' activities to the activities permissible for state banks; and (5) state
"wild card" statutes, which impose national bank regulations on state banks.22
Recent efforts at coordination between federal and state agencies also sug-
gests the lack of competition between them. 23
In addition to the arguments, discussed above, that the competition be-
tween regulators encourages lax regulations (or, more cynically, -permits
greater risk-taking), the dual banking system can be criticized for creating a
costly system of overlapping regulation. State banks are subject to significant
federal regulation, primarily because their deposits are insured by the FDIC.24
The regulatory overlap means, for example, that state banks will be examined
periodically by both federal and state authorities. This is costly for banks and
their customers, who ultimately bear the burden of these costs. While federal
and state authorities have made efforts recently to coordinate examination and
supervision,25 the overlap is far from being eliminated.
Finally, the dual banking system has been the subject of scholarly criticism
because of the moral hazard created by the insurance of state banks' deposits
by the FDIC. Under this theory, state regulators have less incentive to pre-
serve the safety and soundness of state banks because the losses from state-
bank failures are borne by the FDIC, not the state.26 This theory, of course,
does not take into consideration the strong incentive held by state regulators
and bank officials to avoid bank failures, 27 not because of the direct financial
impact on state coffers, but because of the political (i.e., loss of confidence in
state regulators) and indirect economic (i.e., loss of jobs and a source of local
financing) damage caused by the failure of a state bank. Nonetheless, our na-
tion has recent experience with massive thrift failures, and the staggering bur-
den borne by the nation's taxpayers. 2 As a result, it is difficult to equate the
22. Id.
23. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
24. State banks may also be members of the Federal Reserve System and, as such, are
regulated by the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System.
25. A State-Federal Working Group composed of state regulators and FDIC and Federal
Reserve officials has been formed to "streamline and improve the coordination of the examina-
tion and supervision of state-chartered banks operating across state lines." Ellen C. Lamb,
FDIC Press or "State-Federal Working Group" Release (Oct. 16, 1995). Efforts at coordination
like these suggest an atmosphere of cooperation, rather than competition, between federal and
state regulators.
26. Wilmarth, supra note 7, at 1241.
27. Id. at 1242.
28. The General Accounting Office recently estimated the cost of the S&L cleanup at
1996]
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state regulator's or bank official's incentives for avoiding failure with the Fed-
eral Government's concerns for safety and soundness.
III. RECENT CHALLENGES TO THE DUAL BANKING
Despite continued declarations of support for the dual banking system by
Congress and the federal regulators, recent and proposed changes in banking
regulation could threaten the meaningful existence of the state-side of the dual
banking system. While Congress has never attempted complete preemption of
states' authority over issues relating to banking, the federal legislation of re-
cent years proves that Congress is unwilling to leave the safety and soundness
of federally insured banks to the state regulators.
In the wake of the bank and S&L failures of the 1980s and early 1990s,
Congress passed far-reaching legislation in the hope of preventing future fail-
ures. That legislation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve-
ment Act of 1991 ("FDICIA"),29 with its focus on maintaining banks' safety
and soundness, made significant changes affecting the vitality of the dual
banking system. FDICIA amended the Federal Deposit Insurance Act3" to
limit, with certain exceptions, the activities and equity investments of state-
chartered banks to those permissible to national banks.31  This portion of
FDICIA impacts significantly the underlying premises of the dual banking
system. FDICIA undermines competition between the regulators as the justifi-
cation for the dual banking system, since the legislation contracted signifi-
cantly the sphere of competition by preventing states from attracting bank
charters by allowing broader activities or investments.32 Similarly, FDICIA
$160.1 billion. Financial Digest, WASH. POST., July 13, 1996, at FI. The outcome of the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996), added
as much as $20 million to the cleanup total. Jerry Knigh & Joan Biskupic, High Court Ruling
May Add Billions to S&L Cleanup Costs, WASH. POST., July 2, 1996, at Al.
29. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
30. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, ch. 967, 64 Stat. 873 (1950).
31. With respect to state banks' activities, the statute provides:
After the end of the -year period beginning on December 19, 1991, an insured State
bank may not engage as principal in any type of activity that is not permissible for a na-
tional bank unless-(1) the [FDIC] has determined that the activity would pose no sig-
nificant risk to the appropriate deposit insurance fund; and (2) the State bank is, and
continues to be, in compliance with applicable capital standards prescribed by the ap-
propriate Federal banking agency.
Id.
32. Even prior to FDICIA, federal regulators had the ability to limit, through their cease
and desist powers, state banks' activities and investments to the extent that they were deemed to
be "unsafe or unsound banking practices." 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1992). For a general discus-
sion of the federal regulators' cease and desist authority based on "unsafe or unsound banking
practices," See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties Demanding Cousin: Bank Director
Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175 (1995).
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foils the states' role as laboratories of innovation as the basis for the dual
banking system, as the act diminished states' ability to innovate, particularly in
the area of permissible bank activities.
Congress appears more reluctant to preempt states' role in banking when
the issues are not directly tied to safety and soundness.33 With the passage of
the McFadden Act in 1927, national banks were given the authority to open
branches, but only to the extent that a state bank was so permitted. 34 This put
the.power to authorize or restrict branching in the hands of state legislators and
regulators who, in turn, generally prevented out-of-state banks (both state and
federal) from opening branches within their respective borders. This was an
effective way for states to limit competition within their borders. 35 In 1994,
The McFadden Act was repealed by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 ("IBBEA"). 36 Under the IBBEA, unless a
state opts-out by June 1, 1997, interstate branching by both national and state
banks will be permitted within its borders.37
Assuming that most states will not opt-out, Congress's push toward inter-
33. Of course, Congress has passed plenty of legislation that preempts state law on issues
unrelated to safety and soundness. For example, the United States Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Smiley v. Citibank, 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996), is a reminder of Congress's significant pre-
emption of state law under Section 30 of the National Bank Act of 1864, Rev. Stat. § 5197, as
amended, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994). Section 85 provides that a national bank may charge "interest
at the rate allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is located." 12 U.S.C. § 85
(1994). This provision allows a national bank to "export" the interest rate allowed by the
bank's home state to customers residing in another state. Smiley expands a national bank's
ability to export interest rates by upholding the Comptroller's interpretation of "interest" under
the statute as including late fees charged to credit card customers. Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1730.
34. McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1244 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36
(1994)).
35. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking
System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 702 (1988). In recent years, however, many states have cho-
sen to open their borders to the growth of interstate banking by allowing out-of-state bank
holding companies to acquire banks within their borders. See generally Northeast Bancorp, Inc.
v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159 (1985). While the bank
holding company structure does not permit branching across state borders, it does permit the
bank holding company, through its bank subsidiaries, to do business in more than one state. The
inefficiencies generated by such a system are outside the scope of this essay.
36. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994).
37. Specifically, the IBBEA permits the responsible federal banking agency to approve a
merger between banks with different home states, unless the state of one of the home states "has
enacted a law after September 29, 1994, and before June 1, 1997, that-(i) applies equally to all
out-of-State banks; and (ii) expressly prohibits merger transactions involving out-of-State
banks." 12 U.S.C. § 183lu(a) (1994). In addition, the IBBEA permits interstate branching
through newly established branches if, inter alia, "there is in effect in the host State a law that
-(i) applies equally to all banks; and (ii) expressly permits all out-of-State banks to establish de
novo branches in such State." 12 U.S.C. § 36(g) (1994).
1996]
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state branching illuminates the current status of the dual banking system.38
Although Congress clearly expressed a strong desire for interstate branching
through the passage of the IBBEA, it stopped short of usurping a state's right
to decide whether interstate branching would be permissible within its bor-
ders.39  This evidences Congress's continued respect for the states' role in
regulating the banking industry.
Another byproduct of interstate branching relevant to the dual banking
system is that it will most likely accelerate the current trend of consolidation in
the industry. The number of banks in the United States has steadily decreased
over recent years and will likely continue to decrease with the advent of inter-
state branching.4" This alters, and possibly expands, the role of the state regu-
lators since they now may play a role in supervising branches of out-of-state
banks.4 In addition, the competition for banks charters may increase with the
continued consolidation. 42 As discussed in Part IV, however, it does not ap-
pear -that this increased competition has extinguished the demand for state
charters.
Other industry developments also impact the vitality of the dual banking
system. The Comptroller of the Currency recently cited, as no longer relevant
in America's twentieth century financial services industry: "the notion that
geography--the physical location of a financial services provider or a financial
transaction-forms the appropriate basis for determining what rules apply to
the offering of financial services, and who applies those rules." 43 The reason
38. Most states have opted-in early, as permitted by statute, and only one state (Texas), has
opted out so far. CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISOR, STATUS INTERSTATE BANKING
LEGISLATION, (Sept. 23, 1996) (visited Feb. 6, 1997) <http://www.csbsdal.org/newspr/
96status.html>.
39. Congress, however, did limit the state's ability, as provided under the Douglas
Amendment, to prevent out-of-state bank holding companies from acquiring banks within their
borders. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1994). See supra note 37.
40. At the end of 1985, there were 14,417 insured commercial banks. By the end of 1995,
there were 9,943 insured commercial banks. FDIC HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON BANKING 1934-
1995: TABLE CB-I, (visited June 10, 1996) <http://www.fdic.gov/research/sob/hist95/index.
html>.
41. The IBBEA provides that a state bank regulator may examine a branch operating in its
state by an out-of-state insured state bank "for the purpose of determining compliance with host
State laws, including those that govern banking, community reinvestment, fair lending, con-
sumer protection, and permissible activities; and ... to ensure that the activities of the branch
are not conducted in an unsafe or unsound manner." 12 U.S.C. § 1820(h)(1) (1994). If the state
bank regulator finds a violation, the regulator may institute enforcement proceedings "as would
be permitted underthe law of the host State as if the branch were a bank chartered by that host
State." 12 U.S.C. § 1820(h)(2) (1994).
42. Last year, however, 102 commercial banks received charters. This is the largest num-
ber of commercial bank charters since 1991. Ricki Heifer, FDIC Chairman, Remarks Before the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Conference on Interstate Banking (Feb. 2, 1996).
43. Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Jerome Levy
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cited by the Comptroller for the irrelevancy of geography is the growth of
technology in financial markets, i.e., e-money and e-banking.4
Consumers know that both their charge card (which is often operated by
an out-of-state bank), automated teller machine card, or even their checks may
be accepted across the country and around the world. Customers do business
with their banks, thrifts or credit union by mail, telephone or computer modem
from every conceivable location. Consumers see their bank's logo in numer-
ous states. Thus, the states' traditional geographic control over banking, i.e.,
control over the operation of banking within their borders, is becoming less
relevant in today's market. As discussed above, Congress has historically and
recently allowed states to prohibit out-of-state banks from doing business
within their borders. To the extent that the importance of a location of a bank,
i.e., its headquarters or its branches, is fading in the eyes of the consumer,
Congress's deference to the states on this issue is becoming less meaningful.
Finally, efforts at consolidation of the federal banking regulators are seen
as a threat to the dual banking system. Consolidation of the federal banking
agencies may entail consolidating some or all of the functions of the FDIC, the
Fed, and the OCC into one agency. The federal entity that would be responsi-
ble for supervision of state-chartered banks would also be the entity in charge
of the supervision and chartering of national banks.45 The fear is that the con-
solidated banking regulator may have an institutional bias in favor of national
banks over state banks.46 In the Fall of 1993, the Clinton Administration pro-
posed the creation of a federal banking commission that would regulate all
FDIC-insured depository institutions and their holding companies.4 7 Criticism
Economics Institute (April 12, 1996).
44. Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the ABA Conference
on Financing Commerce in Cyberspace, Washington, D.C. (May 8, 1996).
45. Today, these functions are handled separately. The FDIC has primary supervisory re-
sponsibility for state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. The Fed has
primary supervisory responsibility for state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. The OCC has primary supervisory responsibility and chartering authority for national
banks. See supra note 1.
46. The National Governors Association warned: "The charterer of national banks cannot
be given oversight of state-chartered banks, or the result will be a bias toward national bank re-
quests and issues." Robert M. Garsson, Governors' Stand on Preserving Role of States Heart-
ens Foes ofAgency Consolidation Plan, AM. BANKER, Feb. 8, 1994 at 4. The American Bank-
ers Association and The Bankers Roundtable have expressed similar concerns. Bank Trade
Groups Voice Concerns Over Regulatory Consolidation, 1536 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 9
(February 25, 1994). See also, Catherine A. Ghiglieri, Superregulator Dooms Dual Banking
System, AM. BANKER, Mar. 9, 1994 at 7; Barbara F. Bronstien, Dual System Is Seen Threatened,
Resilient, AM. BANKER, April 20, 1994 at 6.
47. For a summary of the proposal, see 1649 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 89,593 (May
3, 1996). The Administration's proposal would have created a new Federal Banking Commis-
sion. Recently, Administration officials have recommended delaying action on agency consoli-
dation pending Congress' resolution of proposed expansion of banks' securities and insurance
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over the effect of the administration's proposal on the dual banking system,
among other criticisms, spurred the Department of Treasury to amend the pro-
posal to protect the interests of state-chartered banks.48 This provides another
example of the political power of the proponents of the dual banking system.
The fate of proposals for consolidation is unknown at this time. It is likely,
however, that any future proposals will contain some concessions to state-
chartered banks.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE PERSISTENT DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
Despite recent threats to the dual banking system, it persists. While the
state-side of the dual banking system has appeared most vulnerable to extinc-
tion, recent evidence suggests otherwise. From 1991 to 1994, more banks
switched from national to state charters than from state to national charters. 49
In 1995, out of the 102 commercial banks that received charters, seventy-five
percent chose state charters. 50 This suggests, at the very least, that the states
are holding their own in the competition for bank charters. The analysis, how-
ever, might differ if the size of the institution were taken into account. The
majority of state banks are smaller institutions. In other words, most larger in-
stitutions choose national charters.
The fees charged by the OCC are a source of the imbalance in conver-
powers. Bank Regulators Urge Congress to Delay agency Consolidation 1649 Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 (May 3, 1996). Congress, however, continues to receive recommendations for
consolidation. The General Accounting Office recently proposed consolidated supervision of
banks and thrifts to the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services. James L. Both-
well, Director of Financial Institutions and Market Issues, Testimony Before the House Com-
mittee on Banking and Financial Services GAO/T-GGD-96-117 (May 2, 1996). With regard to
agency consolidation, Mr. Bothwell provided the following recommendation:
Reduce the number of federal agencies with primary responsibilities for bank oversight:
We believe that a logical step in consolidating is to combine the Office of Thrift Super-
vision (OTS), the Office of the 'Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and FDIC's primary
supervisory responsibilities for state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal
Reserve into a new federal banking agency or commission.... This new independent
agency, together with the Federal Reserve, could be assigned responsibility for compre-
hensive, consolidated supervision of those banking organizations under their purview,
with appropriate functional supervision of individual components.
Id.
48., The amended proposal provided that the Federal Banking Commission would rely on
the results of state examinations for well-capitalized banks with assets of less than $250 million.
Treasury Announces Changes to Regulatory Consolidation Plan, 1537 Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 1-2 (Mar. 4, 1994). In addition, the FDIC would continue its role of approving the ac-
tivities of state-chartered banks-a power that would not be given to the Federal Banking
Commission. Id.
49. Justin Fox, Stampede Toward State Charters Makes the OCC Change Its Tune, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 28, 1995, at 3.
50. Heifer, supra note 42.
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sions.51 Fees are important in charter choice for smaller institutions.5 2 The
states charge significantly lower fees to the banks they supervise than the OCC
charges to national banks.53 The OCC, however, has made recent efforts to
reduce its fees. If the OCC is successful, lower fees may no longer provide
state regulators with a means for attracting bank charters.
Without congressional intervention, however, the OCC will experience
difficulty cutting its fees enough'to become competitive with state regulators
who have much lower overhead. For example, state regulators often rely on
the FDIC or the Fed to conduct examinations of their banks. 54 This contributes
to the lower fees charged by state regulators to their banks. State banks may
not retain this advantage. The Clinton Administration, as part of a seven-year
balanced budget proposal, proposed that state banks be charged for the exami-
nations by the Fed and the FDIC.55 While this proposal is not currently under
consideration, it could resurface in future efforts to raise federal revenues.
Another factor contributing to the recent preference for state charters by
some bank managers is the perception that the OCC's examiners are tougher
on their banks. Regardless of whether or not this is actually true, it seems
logical that banks might have less difficulty working with an examiner who is
a resident in their state and more familiar with the local economy than a na-
tional bank examiner who may be less sympathetic to local idiosyncrasies. As
discussed above, however, "geography" is becoming less and less important
in the banking industry. As financial services become more and more global-
ized, local idiosyncrasies may become less relevant to the business of bank-
ing. 56
For the reasons discussed above, the issue of fees and the examiners' sym-
pathy for local concerns may prove ephemeral. Moreover, many of the tradi-
51. Id.
52. Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency Testimony, Remarks Before the
Committee on Banking and Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives (April 30,
1996).
53. Watt, supra note 17 (state fees run approximately one-half of the fees paid by national
banks) (transcript Available from author); see also Kenneth Cline, Atlanta's Bank South Applies
for Conversion To a State Charter, AM. BANKER, June 22, 1995 at 4 (Chief Executive Officer of
Bank South found it 50% less expensive to operate under a state, as opposed to national, char-
ter). But see James B. Arndorfer, More Calif Groups Abandoning State Charters, AM.
BANKER, October 23, 1995, at 11 (reporting on California credit unions switching to federal
charters to avoid state taxes).
54. Fox, supra note 49.
55. Administration Proposes Changing State Banks for Exams 1630 Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 (Dec. 21, 1995).
56. Of course, many smaller banks are counting on the existence of a market for local
banking services to stay in business. Their hope is that there will always be a corc of small
business customers and individual consumers who would prefer to do their banking business
with a smaller institution run by local managers.
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tional justifications for the dual banking system discussed in Part II can be
dismissed as merely theoretical or at best uncertain."
The future of the dual banking system lies most logically in states' contin-
ued efforts at innovation.5" In the past, states have served as the forerunners to
important developments in the banking industry. States must continue to in-
novate or their role in the financial industry may become, at best, ceremonial.
While Congress is not likely to leave issues directly relating to the safety and
soundness of financial institutions to the states, Congress has never shown a
desire to preempt comprehensively the states' role in the supervision of finan-
cial institutions.
One area that appears ripe for state activism is the improved delivery of fi-
nancial services to underserved neighborhoods. Congress enacted the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act ("CRA") "to encourage [financial] institutions to
help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered
consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions."59 The CRA,
however, has been subject of much criticism and invitations for reform. 60
Moreover, only a handful of states have enacted their own laws addressing
community reinvestment. 6' It is difficult to imagine an area of financial serv-
ices regulation that should be of more interest to the states, i.e., how financial
services are delivered in their own neighborhoods. 62 Arguably, as multi-state
banks grow, interstate branching spreads, and bank holding companies in-
crease their market share, the need for CRA-type initiatives becomes even
more critical. Innovation in this area would benefit not only the localities in-
tended as beneficiaries, but may provide empirical evidence that would facili-
57. For example, the existence and/or benefits of competition between the regulators is un-
certain. See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
58. Ricki Heifer, Remarks at the Conference of State Bank Supervisors Annual Meeting
and Conference (May 4, 1996) (visited Oct. 25, 1996) <gopher://gopher.fdic.gov:70/00/press/
speech/4may.txt>.
59. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1994).
60. See generally Andrew Miller, The New York Proposal to Revise the Community Rein-
vestment Act: A Qualitative Step Towards Objectivity and Effectiveness, 43 CATH. U. L. REv.
958-80 (1994).
61. Id.atn.127.
62. Congress recently recognized the importance of states' authority in issues of commu-
nity reinvestment. The IBBEA provides with regard to interstate branching that:
The laws of the host State regarding community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair
lending, and establishment of intrastate branches shall apply to any branch in the host
State of an out-of-State national bank to the same extent as such State laws apply to a
branch of a bank chartered by that State, except-(i) when Federal law preempts the ap-
plication of such State laws to a national bank; or (ii) when the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency determines that the application of such State laws would have a discriminatory ef-
fect on the branch in comparison with the effect the application of such State laws would
have with respect to branches of a bank chartered by the host State.
12 U.S.C. § 36(0(1) (1994).
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tate reform of the CRA.
CONCLUSION
The states' role in the chartering and supervision of banks does not face a
current threat of eradication. The states' role, however, continues to evolve.
With a heightened federal attentiveness to the safety and soundness of feder-
ally-insured institutions, because of the hard lessons learned from the S&L cri-
sis, the states' role on issues relating to banks' safety and soundness is dimin-
ished by federal preemption. Generally, however, Congress has not extended
preemption broadly into other areas of bank supervision.
The fact remains that the United States banking system would continue to
function, if not thrive, without the dual banking system. While the dual bank-
ing system serves no necessary purpose, the benefit of the system lies in the
opportunities for innovation that the system provides and, perhaps even en-
courages. For this benefit to be meaningful, states must actively pursue op-
portunities for innovation. Continued, and perhaps increased, innovation by
state regulators and legislators would provide a concrete, as opposed to senti-
mental, basis for the preservation of the dual banking system.
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